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INTRODUCTION 
Is it possible to gain knowledge1 by taking psychedelic2 drugs? One influential answer is 
‘yes’: according to this conception, by inducing mystical states of consciousness, 
psychedelics afford direct knowledge of supernatural, transcendent dimensions of reality. 
This is an entheogenic conception of the drugs as agents that “generate the divine within”. 
A second influential answer is ‘no’: since materialism or physicalism3 is true, there are 
no transcendent realities, and psychedelics just cause compelling hallucinations or 
delusions. This is a psychotomimetic or hallucinogenic conception of the drugs as 
psychosis-mimicking or hallucination-generating agents whose essential effects are anti-
epistemic4;  far from facilitating knowledge gain, psychedelics actively hinder it. 
A third, relatively unexplored view is that psychedelics can afford genuine 
epistemic benefits, even if materialism is true and there is no transcendent reality.  From 
this perspective, the drugs' epistemic credentials do not depend on the existence of 
anything supernatural. Rather, psychedelics can afford genuine and sometimes 
transformative insights of a kind compatible with physicalism. 
Several authors have recently made proposals along these lines. Here I offer a 
                                                 
1 [This term is examined closely later in the chapter. Ed.] 
2 My sole focus in this paper is ‘classic’, serotonin-2a agonist psychedelics such as LSD, psilocybin, 
mescaline, and DMT/ayahuasca; I reserve the term psychedelic for substances of this class. 
3 Despite philosophical complications, I will use the terms ‘materialism’, ‘physicalism’, and ‘naturalism’ 
interchangeably, to refer to views on which mind and consciousness always result from or depend on 
the complex activities of ultimately non-minded things (such as atoms): that is, views which hold that 
the mental is not fundamental to reality, but arises from or is constructed out of the non-mental. This 
excludes mind-body dualism, idealism and its variants (such as cosmopsychism), panpsychism and its 
variants (such as pan-experientialism and pan-protopsychism), and neutral monism (in Russellian and 
other versions.) It is also intended to exclude all metaphysically literal varieties of theism. 
4 ‘Epistemic’ is a philosophical term meaning ‘of or pertaining to knowledge’. 
2 
 
taxonomy and critical review of these proposals using standard categories from 
epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge. This is intended as a contribution to 
the “progressive initiative to demystify the psychedelic experience” being pursued by 
Carhart-Harris and colleagues (Carhart-Harris et al. 2018). 
While it is possible that psychedelics afford propositional knowledge gain, I 
suggest the most promising idea is that they offer new knowledge of old facts (Gertler 
1999). Rather than helping us learn new factual information, psychedelics allow us to 
understand or appreciate already-known (or otherwise knowable) facts in deep, vivid, 
affectively and motivationally significant ways. 
Some authors have tried to refute the very idea of psychedelic-assisted knowledge 
gain. Roche (2010) argues that psychedelics impair the operation of brain mechanisms 
whose function is to represent reality accurately. It is highly unlikely, he says, that such 
impairment would lead to epistemic benefits. But in this dialectical context, the claim that 
“impairment” is psychedelics' only or most important effect is question-begging. 
Certainly some of their paradigmatic perceptual effects are misrepresentational, as when 
they cause subjects to perceive stationary objects as moving (e.g. the phenomenon of 
‘walls breathing’). But the question at issue is whether some of their various effects on 
cognition and perception might be epistemically beneficial, even though others are 
detrimental or neutral. Looking through a telescope impairs one's ability to perceive near 
objects accurately, while improving one's ability to perceive distant objects accurately. 
Some practices and technologies that affect humans' epistemic capacities improve them 
in one domain despite impairing them in others (Bortolotti 2015). 
Another sceptical argument is as follows: for any putative drug-induced (or 
altered-state-induced) knowledge gain, either we can verify it independently or we 
cannot. If we cannot, then we have no reason to trust it; and if we can, then the drug (or 
altered state) is redundant, since we could have obtained the knowledge anyway (cf. 
Windt 2011) 
One possible response is to suggest that we might independently verify a method 
of learning about a certain type of fact, obviating the need to verify independently each 
specific fact learned by that method. For example, suppose that certain findings about 
psychedelics' neurocognitive effects, combined with independent evidence about the 
functional architecture of the brain, support the following claim: psychedelics promote 
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accurate and unbiased introspection of hidden or repressed desires and motivations. In 
that case, we could adopt a general policy of trusting psychedelic-assisted introspection 
of this kind, without needing independent verification of each of its individual 
deliverances. A second possible response would be to concede the point regarding factual 
or propositional knowledge, but hold that psychedelics afford access to other kinds of 
knowledge, discussed further below. 
In any case, I do not think that a priori master arguments can establish the 
existence or otherwise of psychedelic-assisted knowledge gain. Rather, we must consider 
specific proposals about psychedelic epistemology individually, on their own merits, in 
light of the best available evidence. 
 
KNOWLEDGE THAT 
When we think about gaining knowledge, we usually think of what philosophers call 
factual or propositional knowledge, otherwise known as “knowledge that”. This is the 
kind of knowledge that one can gain (inter alia) through testimony, or through reading 
textbooks; it amounts to knowing that certain statements are true, that certain facts or 
states of affairs exist. Examples might be knowing that Paris is the capital of France, that 
next Thursday is aunt Judith's birthday, or that the boiling point of water at sea level is 
100 Celsius. This is the kind of knowledge at issue in claims that psychedelics can 
promote genuine extra-sensory perception, such as telepathy or precognition—but such 
proposals are prima facie inconsistent with physicalism, and compelling evidence for 
them is lacking. 
One less mysterious type of factual knowledge that psychedelics might afford is 
knowledge of one's previously hidden or unconscious mental states. Their putative ability 
to do this was the premise of the psycholytic form of therapy practised in Europe 
throughout the 1960s, in which patients were given low doses of psychedelics to facilitate 
psychoanalytic discoveries about their own repressed desires, motivations, and so forth 
(McCabe et al. 1972). As Metzinger (2003, p. 249) points out, many patients given 
psychedelics report such apparent epiphanies, and seem to improve clinically; a simple 
explanation is that at least some of the insights are genuine (cf. Shanon 2010). 
There is no doubt that people intoxicated by psychedelics have experiences of 
apparent insight into their own minds (Shanon 2002). There are two questions: first, do 
4 
 
these insight-like experiences really cause clinical benefits? Second, are the apparent 
insights genuine? On the first count, there is little evidence as yet. Controlled and rigorous 
psychedelic research in the 21st century has tended rather to focus on correlations between 
mystical-type experiences and clinical benefits (Letheby 2015). It would be relatively 
straightforward, however, to see if subjective feelings of psychological insight predict 
clinical improvement, and Carhart-Harris (2018) has proposed doing this, using a scale 
developed to measure the feeling of emotional insight in dreams. 
Whether or not it predicts clinical improvement, there is a separate question about 
whether the feeling of insight is veridical. On the face of it, confabulations that feel like 
insights could equally well have emotional and therapeutic benefits. As Windt puts it, 
“phenomenal certainty—the experience of persuasion or knowing—is not the same as 
epistemic justification” (2011, p. 246). So how can we know which it is? This is very 
difficult; as per the sceptical argument above, it would seem to require that we have some 
independent way of confirming or falsifying patients' psychedelic-induced claims about 
their own previously unconscious psychological states. This, of course, is the basic 
methodological problem of consciousness research: the unavoidability of heavy reliance 
on introspective verbal report. 
As mentioned earlier, one solution might be if there were a theory of the cognitive 
functions of the brain regions affected by psychedelics that entailed psychedelic-induced 
changes should lead to veridical insights. Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) offer a neo-
Freudian, ”neuropsychoanalytic” interpretation of the function of the brain's default mode 
network (DMN) and its interactions with limbic and other systems which suggests that 
psychedelic-induced downregulation of the DMN could facilitate genuine self-discovery. 
This is a possibility that deserves further theoretical analysis—which is beyond the scope 
of this chapter5. Another possibility is that subjects' putative insights could be tested 
against outcomes of behavioural measures—for instance, emotional and perceptual 
priming effects, obtained prior to the session. Ingenious methods have been used to probe 
the introspective accuracy of meditation practitioners (Fox et al. 2012) and some of these 
could perhaps be adapted to the psychedelic state, though the intense phenomenology of 
the latter may pose problems. 
It has also been suggested that psychedelics can allow users to gain (non-
                                                 
5 See Carhart-Harris and Friston (2019) for further discussion. 
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telepathic) insights into others’ minds. As Shanon (2010) points out, users of ayahuasca 
sometimes feel, when looking at another person, that they are grasping something 
fundamental about the other's character—perhaps as though the other's mental states, 
character traits, or aspects of their biography are ‘written on their face’. Are these apparent 
insights genuine? They would be relatively straightforward to test, in principle—again, 
given some independent means of verification. Not all putative insights of this kind will 
be easy to operationalise. However, one possibility might be to have psychedelically-
intoxicated subjects guess at others' approximate (relative) scores on the Big Five 
personality domains (Gosling et al. 2003) and see if their accuracy exceeds that of subjects 
under placebo, when relevant variables are controlled for. 
One issue is that this kind of experiment would require multiple subjects taking 
the drug together in the same session, which does not typically happen in modern clinical 
research. (It happens in non-clinical contexts, of course, such as traditional ayahuasca 
rituals—but in such contexts other variables become harder to control.) It is also worth 
pointing out that there is some preliminary evidence that psilocybin impairs subjects' 
ability to recognise emotional facial expressions, although this is in relation to static, 
disembodied images of faces on screens; matters may be different when dealing with 
embodied, dynamic human beings (Schmidt et al. 2013). 
Shanon (2010) also raises the interesting possibility that subjects can gain an 
abstract type of self-knowledge about patterns of thought and behaviour in their lives. He 
gives the example of a subject who saw visions of several episodes from her life 
juxtaposed thematically, rather than chronologically, leading her to see the abstract 
commonalities in superficially different events. It seems entirely plausible that 
psychedelics might afford this kind of knowledge, given their capacity to enhance pattern-
recognition, and that such knowledge might be therapeutically beneficial. As always, 
however, it is difficult to know how to test this, and especially difficult to know how to 
distinguish cases of veridical pattern-recognition from cases of pareidolia, or pattern-
imposition (which could equally well lead to clinical benefits.) 
Finally, one famous pilot study raises the possibility that psychedelics might help 
subjects discover novel and creative solutions to problems in their fields of specialisation 
(Harman et al. 1966; cf. Shanon 2010). Although these results require more rigorous 
replication, this also seems plausible. One view is that psychedelics serve to enhance the 
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context of discovery, as it is called in philosophy of science, allowing subjects to 'think 
outside the box' and come up with novel and creative ideas. The 'context of justification', 
however, in which ideas are scrutinised for adequacy and accuracy, would be another 
matter (Hoyningen-Huene 1987). So there are two possible claims here: (i) that 
psychedelics simply help people come up with interesting new ideas, and (ii) that they 
also help people reliably discern which of these ideas are correct. The latter would be 
much more controversial. This is an epistemological proposal on which more conceptual 
work is needed. 
 
KNOWLEDGE HOW 
A second type of knowledge is knowing how to do certain things, sometimes called 
'ability knowledge' and roughly equivalent to the possession of skills. Examples include 
knowing how to ride a bicycle, how to dance, or how to program a computer. Is it possible 
that psychedelics facilitate the acquisition of new skills or abilities? 
One proposal from Shanon is that psychedelic states allow subjects to learn how 
to skilfully navigate psychedelic states. As he says, “people may eventually become 
accomplished in the very art of drinking ayahuasca... drinking ayahuasca is an artful skill 
in its own right” (Shanon 2010). There is apparent experimental support for this claim: 
dysfunctions in executive processing under ayahuasca are considerably lessened in 
experienced drinkers, which could be interpreted as showing that these people have 
gained some skill in managing the intoxication (Bouso et al. 2013). 
This may seem like a trivial form of knowledge gain, akin to claiming that 
psychedelic experience lets people learn what it is like to undergo psychedelic experience. 
But it depends on what kind of skill navigating psychedelic states actually is. One 
intriguing possibility is that it is similar or identical to the ability to let go, open, and 
accept inner experience—perhaps the same kind of skill in relating to one’s mental 
contents that is deliberately cultivated in mindfulness meditation (Baer 2009). 
There is a suggestive set of observations supporting this idea. The standard 
instructions given to subjects in psychedelic clinical trials emphasise the importance of 
an open, curious, non-reactive attitude toward whatever strange or frightening phenomena 
arise, and clinical wisdom suggests that following this instruction helps to ensure a 
beneficial experience. Some trials deliberately recruit subjects with experience of 
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psychedelic states on the grounds that they are better able to navigate the experience 
calmly and (relatively) fearlessly. Psilocybin- and LSD-induced states have been found 
to increase the personality trait of Openness to Experience (MacLean et al. 2011, Lebedev 
et al. 2016). 
Meanwhile, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), a key node of the DMN 
implicated in self-representation, is downregulated by psychedelics—correlating with 
ego dissolution (Carhart-Harris et al. 2012)—and exhibits thinning in long-term religious 
ayahuasca users, correlating with the extent of prior ayahuasca use and with psychometric 
scores for 'self-transcendence' (Bouso et al. 2015). Neurofeedback studies of experienced 
meditators find that PCC activity co-varies with the feeling of being 'caught up' in 
experience—in other words, becoming gripped by a train of thoughts or feelings such that 
one loses one’s open, non-reactive stance (Brewer et al. 2013). Finally, the 'decentering' 
capacities cultivated by mindfulness practice are elevated in the days following an 
ayahuasca session, and these psychological changes correlate with neural changes centred 
on the PCC (Soler et al. 2016, 2018, Sampedro et al. 2017). 
This suggests a straightforward experimental test, similar in spirit to recent studies 
exploring the effects of psilocybin sessions on novice meditators undergoing meditation 
training (Griffiths et al. 2017). It would be possible to explore prospectively any lasting 
effects of a series of psychedelic sessions on subjects’ decentering capacities while sober, 
and the duration of any such increases. (Perhaps retention of executive function while 
intoxicated could also be used as a measure in this context.) Substantial positive results 
would support the claim that psychedelic experiences can help subjects gain knowledge 
of how to let go and accept inner experience. 
Shanon (2010) lists a number of other putatively epistemic benefits of ayhauasca 
classified under 'knowledge how', such as increased well-being and stamina, and 
enhancements to artistic performance and creativity, while intoxicated. However, unless 
these enhancements lead to lasting improvements in the relevant domains while sober, it 
is not clear that they amount to knowledge of any sort. In my view they might better be 
described as transient performance enhancements. 
 
KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 
A third category recognised in epistemology is knowledge by acquaintance, which is less 
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conceptually straightforward than the others. The idea is simple enough on an intuitive 
level: consider the different ways in which you can know about Donald Trump. You can 
know all sorts of facts about the man indirectly, by watching TV, reading news articles, 
and the like. Or you can meet Trump and become acquainted with him directly. After this, 
you know him in a sense in which you did not before. Thus, knowledge by acquaintance 
contrasts with indirect knowledge mediated by (mere) description or testimony. 
One debate in philosophy of mind, relevant to psychedelic epistemology, concerns 
Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment 'Mary's Room'. This was originally given as 
an argument for mind-body dualism. Mary is a super neuroscientist living at a future time 
when neuroscientific and medical knowledge is complete. Everything about the 
functioning of the human brain and body is fully described and understood. Mary lives 
her whole life in a black-and-white room and never sees colours, but while in her room, 
she masters the entirety of neuroscience. (She is a super scientist, after all.) She learns 
everything there is to know about what goes on in the retina, the visual cortex, and so 
forth when a human sees something red. One day, Mary leaves her room for the first time 
and sees something red, such as a ripe tomato. Intuitively, she learns something new and 
important: she learns what it is like to see red. Since Mary supposedly already had all the 
physical information about seeing red, Jackson (1982, 1986) concludes that there is more 
information than this, and so physicalism is false. 
Many philosophers share a strong intuition that Mary does learn something new, 
while remaining unconvinced that the argument refutes physicalism. Consequently, they 
have expended a lot of energy trying to say what sort of knowledge she gains, exactly, 
and how (despite first appearances) it is compatible with physicalism. The conceptual 
tools and distinctions developed in this literature could be useful for a sophisticated and 
precise characterisation of psychedelics’ possible epistemic benefits. One prominent 
suggestion is that before leaving the room, Mary has only indirect knowledge by 
description about the experiential phenomenon of seeing red, but when she leaves the 
room, she gains knowledge by acquaintance with it (Conee 1994). 
I have argued elsewhere that psychedelics afford knowledge by acquaintance of 
two important facts: the vast potential of the human mind, and the constructed nature of 
the normal sense of self (Letheby 2015, 2016). On the first count, psychedelics certainly 
demonstrate dramatically that the range of human experience is far bigger and stranger, 
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for better and worse, than normal waking consciousness suggests. And even those 
intellectually aware of this fact can find the direct experience a very different matter. An 
obvious example is Aldous Huxley, the long-time student of mysticism, experiencing 
mystical consciousness for the first time under mescaline (Huxley 1954). Pahnke 
describes this insight based on his own clinical observations administering psychedelics 
to terminal patients: 
 
At this point, unless the patient previously had experienced mystical 
consciousness spontaneously, he becomes intensely aware of completely new 
dimensions of experience which he might never before have imagined possible. 
From his own personal experience, he now knows that there is more to the 
potential range of human consciousness than we ordinarily realize. This profound 
and awe-inspiring insight sometimes is experienced as if a veil had been lifted and 
can transform attitudes and behavior. Once a person has had this vision, life and 
death can be looked at from a new perspective. Patients seem able to meet the 
unknown with a new sense of self-confidence and security. Logical arguments that 
human experience must be limited to the narrow range of ordinary human 
consciousness never can have the same force again. 
(Pahnke 1969, p. 15). 
 
On the second count, in ego dissolution experiences, psychedelic subjects come 
face-to-face with the fact that the ordinary sense of a separate and enduring self is a 
vulnerable, contingent, constructed feature of experience. They experience consciousness 
in the absence of the normal sense of self—perhaps of any sense of self at all (though this 
is controversial.) This does not entail that the self is an illusion, of course; psychedelic 
subjects also experience the dissolution of their bodies, which undeniably do exist. Some 
mystics and philosophers (myself6 included) do hold the self to be ultimately illusory. But 
regardless, discovering the constructed nature of one's ordinary experiential sense of self 
is a big deal. Many psychedelic subjects, with or without prior belief in this constructed 
nature, experience it directly and intensely for the first time (cf. Albahari 2014). 
There are other proposals in the same broad spirit as knowledge by acquaintance. 
                                                 
6 Irony unintended but noted. 
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Shanon suggests that a key epistemic benefit of ayahuasca may lie not in generating new 
factual knowledge, but in allowing a deeper apprehension of truths already known: 
 
The information gained may be banal but its mode of appreciation might be 
experienced as special... looking at the leaves of plants observing how they were 
 directed towards the rays of the sun, I felt I was actually seeing the nurturing 
 sustenance of the solar light. Had I obtained any “information” I had not known 
beforehand? I doubt it. But I was open to see the world in a new light. 
 (Shanon 2010). 
 
This is somewhat similar to Tupper's (2003) proposal that psychedelics facilitate 
access to evolutionary old but culturally neglected 'mythic' and 'somatic' forms of 
understanding. Not all of these proposals are captured by the idea of knowledge by 
acquaintance. Moreover, the notion of acquaintance is philosophically problematic. 
Russell (1910) originally defined knowledge by acquaintance as involving no mediation 
of any kind between the mind and the object of knowledge, but it is not clear that this 
ever happens. Finally, acquaintance is a relation, and anyone who thinks the self is illusory 
may wonder: who or what becomes acquainted with the constructed nature of the sense 
of self, or with the mind’s potential? 
One useful concept here may be that of modes of presentation (Alter and Walter 
2007). Once again, the basic idea is intuitive enough7: consider the difference between 
viewing a painting, a photograph, and a CGI animation of the World Trade Centre falling 
on September 11th, 2001. To appreciate that the difference is not simply one of medium 
or representational format, consider too the difference between reading descriptions of 
the event by Al Qaeda, the US Government, and eyewitnesses. Even if the descriptions 
do not factually contradict one another, they will each paint a very different picture of the 
same event. They will each present it in different ways, or under different modes. 
This may be the simplest unifying characterisation of the epistemic benefits 
afforded by psychedelics, other than factual or ability knowledge: they afford the 
apprehension of already-known (or otherwise-knowable) facts via new and different 
modes of presentation. This difference can be vast. Believing intellectually that 
                                                 
7 I am riding roughshod over many important philosophical subtleties here. 
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everything in the universe is deeply interconnected is worlds apart from apprehending this 
profound interconnectedness as a visual, somatic, spatial, and affective sensation vividly 
pervading the entire conscious field. It is akin to the difference between a new recruit's 
belief that they will be shot at, and the experience of standing on a muddy battlefield with 
bullets whizzing past. We might even hold, with some cognitive scientists, that there is a 
crucial difference between mere (abstract propositional) knowledge and real 
understanding8, which requires rich sensory, motor, and affective simulations (Zwaan 
2004). Perhaps psychedelics, by increasing cross-talk between normally distinct brain 
networks (Tagliazucchi et al. 2016), connect memory and cognition more directly to affect 
and perception, allowing us to understand what we otherwise could merely know. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Even those sceptical about supernatural and transcendent realms should take seriously the 
possibility of psychedelic-assisted knowledge gain. I have suggested that psychedelics 
may afford the gaining of factual knowledge (of one's own mind, others' minds, abstract 
patterns in one's life, and novel solutions to specialist problems); of ability knowledge 
(especially knowledge how to let go and accept inner experience); and of greater 
understanding via new modes of presentation. I have also offered some suggestions about 
how to test these hypotheses. The epistemic claims of psychedelic subjects should not be 
accepted uncritically, but nor can they be refuted from the armchair. Specific proposals 
about psychedelic epistemology must be considered in their own right and subjected to 
rigorous interdisciplinary inquiry. Mounting evidence for the therapeutic efficacy of 
psychedelics behoves us urgently to understand the mechanisms of this strikingly novel 
treatment modality. One pressing question is whether it is a form of therapy based on 
genuine insight. I think it probably is—but only further research will tell. Most generally, 
we need to appreciate that there is a viable third way between traditional conceptions of 
psychedelics as entheogens disclosing transcendent supernatural realms, and as 
hallucinogens or psychotomimetics whose epistemic effects are solely detrimental. 
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